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in this article are related to research undertaken in the course of doctoral studies at 
McGill University. The author extends warm thanks for being invited to participate in 
this outstanding symposium. Thank you especially to Nonna Akopyan, Elizabeth Freder-
ick, and Billy Valentine for their assistance with this article, and to Michelle Ross, for her 
exceptional work on organizing this symposium and for her assistance with this article.   
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ABSTRACT 
This article assesses shifting presumptions by three democracies -- 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom – all of whom ap-
pear to have permanently adopted some alterations to their detention 
practices for certain terrorism-related cases since the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 (hereinafter “9/11”).  A review of executive, legislative and 
judicial outcomes in these three countries often reveals an ongoing ten-
sion between the judiciary and the other branches of government, with 
the judiciary frequently citing to traditional constitutional principles to 
reassert the primacy of individual liberties and fair trial guarantees.  In 
spite of such rulings, however, the advance towards some system of pre-
ventive detention and abridged judicial process for terrorism suspects 
continues, in various forms, in each of these countries.  It appears that 
this ongoing tension between some national high courts and political 
branches of government may be based, in part, on the judicial role of sa-
feguarding constitutional protections, while the other branches have in-
creasingly become reliant upon a form of discourse that may be at odds 
with those principles, and much of which was developed in a time of 
perceived emergency.  The premises on which detention practices have 
been altered may not have been fully assessed in the years after 9/11 by 
those in policy-making positions.  This ongoing tension and continuing 
uncertainty as to the status of certain constitutional protections may have 
larger implications for the viability of long-standing constitutional 
norms, as well as for larger criminal-justice standards, and those implica-
tions must be further examined before any such changes do, indeed, be-
come permanent. 
 
 
CONTENTS 
“The Slow Creep of Complacency”: Ongoing Challenges for Demo-
cracies Seeking to Detain Terrorism Suspects 
I. Introduction: Hastily Implemented Changes as Permanent 
Shifts 
II. Presumptions of Change and the Terrorism Discourse 
A. Using the Discourse to Create Presumptions 
B. The Presumption of “The Other” as the More Likely 
DUFFY FINAL- 41 TO 73 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2011  3:55 PM 
“THE SLOW CREEP OF COMPLACENCY”: ONGOING 
CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRACIES SEEKING TO DETAIN 
TERRORISM SUSPECTS                                                            43 
Terrorist 
III. Conclusion: Permanent Changes and the Shifting Sands of 
Constitutional Standards 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: HASTILY IMPLEMENTED CHANGES AS PERMANENT 
SHIFTS 
 
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.3 
 
For many Americans, and indeed for many people around the world, 
the election of U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to initially raise the 
possibility of an end to the controversial detention and interrogation poli-
cies of the Bush Administration.  When President Obama announced, as 
one of his first official actions as President, that he would be closing the 
infamous detention camp at Guantanamo Bay within one year, it seemed 
that this hope was being realized.
4
 
In hindsight, however, it is clear that such promises were not so 
simple, and that, after  years of evolving terrorism detention policies, it 
was not so obvious how to go back, or whether it was even possible or 
advisable to do so.  While a given leader might or might not have made 
different decisions in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, those who as-
sumed power in the following years were faced with the decisions that 
actually were made, and which had been institutionalized in many ways 
over a significant period of time.  Measures implemented sometimes in 
haste after the terrorist attacks had been rendered permanent in many re-
spects, and simple reversal of those policies does not appear to be an 
imminent possibility.
5
 
                                               
3 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted in 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR. 289 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986). 
4 Some changes were made regarding the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, but the goal 
of closing it within a year of President Obama‟s announcement was not met. See infra 
notes 9-16. 
5 See generally David Dyzenhaus, The Permanence of the Temporary - Can Emer-
gency Powers be Normalized?, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA‟S 
ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 21-37 (Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 
Univ. of Toronto Press 2001) (arguing that, rather than attempting to tailor existing law 
based on emergency situations,  democracies should declare a state of emergency when 
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Early in his administration, President Obama seemed to recognize 
that some haste went into initially implementing many of the anti-
terrorism initiatives undertaken by the U.S. when he said: 
Unfortunately, faced with an uncertain threat, our government made a se-
ries of hasty decisions.  I believe that many of these decisions were moti-
vated by a sincere desire to protect the American people.  But I also believe 
that all too often our government made decisions based on fear rather than 
foresight; that all too often our government trimmed facts and evidence to 
fit ideological predispositions.  Instead of strategically applying our power 
and our principles, too often we set those principles aside as luxuries that 
we could no longer afford.  And during this season of fear, too many of us -
- Democrats and Republicans, politicians, journalists, and citizens -- fell si-
lent.6 
Regardless of how it all came about, by the time President Obama 
took office, it was clear that many things originally considered as tempo-
rary, emergency measures had gained indicia of permanence, and the 
presumption appeared to be against moving any of the measures that had 
been put in place back towards the standards that existed before the at-
tacks.  For example, almost as soon as President Obama announced the 
plan to close Guantanamo Bay, a firestorm of controversy erupted within 
the U.S.  Some of the dramatic claims included suggestions that terrorists 
were going to be released to the streets of U.S. cities, and there were on-
going claims by various political figures, including former Vice-
President Richard Cheney, that the Obama Administration was weak on 
terrorism and placing Americans in danger.
7
  
It is unclear if subsequent steps by the U.S. Government were in re-
sponse to this criticism, but it became evident that the change in adminis-
tration did not signal a significant break from the detention policies un-
dertaken in the years after 9/11.  Shortly after the inauguration, the 
                                                                                                         
necessary, and handle accordingly under procedures consistent with the rule of law); see 
also Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
475, 477-78 (2006) (noting that “whatever new powers are conceded to the President in 
this metaphorical war [on terror] will be his forever”). 
6 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009) (transcript available in the National Archives), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/. 
         7 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Cheney Says Current Policies Put More Americans at 
Risk, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/21/AR2009052104427.html (quoting Cheney‟s description 
of the Obama policies as “recklessness cloaked in righteousness”). 
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Obama Administration took the official position that detainees at the Ba-
gram detention center, in Afghanistan, were not entitled to seek habeas 
corpus relief in U.S. federal courts.
8
  On examination of the individual 
cases of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama Administration began 
to publicly comment that, in some of the cases, neither trial nor release 
would be possible. 
Although President Obama was highly critical of the Military 
Commissions during his campaign, in May 2009, he announced that they 
would continue to be used, with some revisions, in instances in which 
trials in U.S. courts were not “feasible.”9  In the interim, a number of the 
detainees had been released pursuant to orders of federal courts, which 
had been hearing habeas corpus claims as a result of the ruling of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush.
10
  
On November 13, 2009, at the very moment that the symposium on 
National Security issues – from which this article arose -- was taking 
place at Pace University School of Law, the U.S. Departments of Justice 
and Defense announced plans for ten of the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay.  Five of them, they announced, would be tried in U.S. federal 
courts.  Five others, they said, would be tried before the “reformed” Mili-
tary Commissions at Guantanamo Bay. 
In so announcing, Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained the de-
                                               
8 Nedra Pickler & Matt Apuzzo, Obama Backs Bush: No Rights for Bagram Prison-
ers, reprinted at INFOWARS, Feb. 21, 2009, http://www.infowars.com/obama-backs-bush-
no-rights-for-bagram-prisoners (describing a Justice Department filing, advising the court 
that the new administration was taking the position, previously taken by the Bush Ad-
ministration, that that detainees at the Bagram Airfield do not have the right to seek ha-
beas corpus relief in U.S. courts). 
9 Andrea Prasow, Falling Short: Justice in the New Military Commissions, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/08/falling-short-justice-new-military-commissions; 
see also Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 
2190 (2009); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454-55 (2009). 
10 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, No. 
04-1166, Memorandum Order (2008) (federal order, pursuant to habeas corpus review, 
ordering that five of the six “Algerian group” members be released, including Lakhdar 
Boumediene, the named party in the U.S. Supreme Court decision); JENNIFER K. ELSEA, 
KENNETH R. THOMAS, & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT 
(2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf. 
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cisions, saying: 
For over two hundred years, our nation has relied on a faithful adherence to 
the rule of law to bring criminals to justice and provide accountability to 
victims.  Once again we will ask our legal system to rise to that challenge, 
and I am confident it will answer the call with fairness and justice. . . .  
Bringing terrorists to justice is an integral part of our national security . . . .  
The reform of Military Commissions and today's announcement are impor-
tant steps in that direction.11 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was immediate controversy about 
this decision, arising from those within the U.S. on both sides of the de-
tention debate.  Opponents of trials raised concerns about insensitivity in 
holding trials so close to the site of the World Trade Center attacks and 
suggested that it would not be safe to bring those accused within the bor-
ders of the United States, or that necessary security would be prohibitive-
ly expensive.
12
  At the same time, those on the other side of the debate 
argued that, while it was laudable that some detainees were finally being 
brought before federal courts, the decision to try other detainees before 
the Military Commissions, even as reconstituted, was still of great con-
cern in terms of legitimacy and procedural fairness.
13
  One of the more 
controversial aspects of the announcement was the determination that 
Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen who was initially captured when he was 
15 years old, would be tried before a Military Commission.
14
 
Adding to the controversy, it has been reported, as of the date of this 
article, that the panel President Obama created to assess the cases at 
Guantanamo Bay is recommending to him that, in relation to approx-
imately 50 of the detainees, trials are not considered possible, and that 
                                               
11 Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Departments of Justice and De-
fense Announce Forum Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Bay Detainees: Decisions on Ac-
cused 9/11 Plotters, Alleged Mastermind of USS Cole Attack & Others (Nov. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20-09/November/09-ag-1224.html [hereinafter 
Guantanamo Announcement]. 
12 As of the date of the writing of this article, it was unclear whether these trials 
would, indeed, take place in New York as initially announced. See Sunday Times, White 
House backs away from 9/11 trial in Manhattan, Jan. 30, 2010, available at 
http://sundaytimes.lk/100131/International/int_06.html;  Pete Yost, Associated Press, 
Holder raises question on 9/11 death penalty, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2010 (noting 
that the notion of trying Khalid Shaik Mohammed in a U.S. federal court had “all but 
been abandoned.”). 
13 Prasow, supra note 9. 
14 This case has been a source of considerable controversy in Canada, and has been 
the subject of two proceedings before the Supreme Court of Canada. See infra notes 55-
91. 
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release is not feasible because the detainees are seen as too dangerous.
15
  
The net result is that, if the U.S. Government adopts the recommenda-
tions of the panel, these people could be considered permanent detainees, 
without any of them having even the prospect of any judicial proceeding 
first.  It seems unnecessary to explain why this is a departure from tradi-
tional concepts of the rule of law and constitutional values within the 
U.S., and it signals that, early promises of change notwithstanding, the 
alterations in detention standards initiated under President Bush were not 
temporary measures, but, rather, in many ways, represent permanent, or 
at least very long-term, changes to the legal landscape within the U.S. 
Through all of this, it is often simply assumed that pre-existing 
criminal standards for handling terrorism cases must be done away with 
in their entirety.  It has frequently been argued that the events of 9/11 
were historically so unprecedented that they required this building of a 
whole new legal structure to handle these cases, a contention that some 
academics continue to dispute: 
But over the past 230 years, the United States has endured two world wars, 
a lengthy cold war, waves of domestic terrorism, and a civil war that almost 
broke the nation apart, without passing legislation that would allow the 
state to detain people for extended periods based on a prediction of future 
dangerousness.16 
Without any doubt, the changes since 9/11 in particular have been 
most prominent in the U.S., but they are certainly not confined there, and 
other liberal democracies also expressly responded to 9/11 with changes 
to their own detention standards.  As has happened in the U.S., many of 
those countries have struggled in the following years with whether the 
                                               
15
 Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends About 50 Guantanamo Detainees Be 
Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104936.h
tml. 
16 Jennifer Daskal, A New System of Preventive Detention? Let’s Take a Deep 
Breath, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT‟L L. 561, 562 (2009) (noting further that those actions that 
were undertaken in those emergency situations were invariably later “resoundingly repu-
diated as mistaken experiments that  are contrary to the United States‟ commitment to 
due process and the rule of law.”); see also Mark R. Shulman, Review of Law and the 
Long War by Benjamin Wittes and Assessing Damage, Urging Action by the Eminent Ju-
rists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Human Rights, 103 Am. J. Int'l L. 808 
(2009)(critiquing the contention that the 9/11 attacks and subsequent threats were so un-
precedented as to require the building of a new detention regime). 
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changes in general are permissible and consistent with their values, and, 
if so, what the acceptable parameters of the changes should be.  It is im-
possible to fully assess the impact of the post-9/11 measures without 
looking to international and domestic responses around the world.  
This is an area of the law that provides challenges for many reasons.  
It changes at a consistent and rapid rate, making it difficult to stay cur-
rent, certainly, but also creating questions for larger theoretical discus-
sions surrounding anti-terrorism measures, since presumptions that arise 
from one scenario might be invalidated by later developments.  It also 
requires a sophisticated understanding of international law, as well as of 
the actions of a range of different governments, taken within the context 
of their own distinct legal systems. 
A collection of essays relating to anti-terrorism detentions around 
the world contains an articulate description of the multi-dimensional cha-
racteristic of this legal discipline: 
It is important that academics bring their critical and comparative insights 
to the global development of anti-terrorism law and policy.  This will be a 
challenging task because anti-terrorism law crosses boundaries between 
states and between domestic, regional and international law.  It also crosses 
traditional disciplinary boundaries between administrative, constitutional, 
criminal, immigration, military law and the laws of war.  In addition, in-
sights from a broad range of disciplines including history, international af-
fairs, military studies, philosophy, religion and politics will assist in under-
standing the development of anti-terrorism law and policy.17 
It is within this complex context that those in decision-making pow-
er are often called upon to make decisions quickly, with lives potentially 
at stake, so it may be understandable in many ways that the decisions that 
are made during a perceived emergency might not turn out, in the long 
run, to have been the most prudent.  When the time allows, however, for 
a more careful consideration of the underpinnings of these changes, that 
consideration must be undertaken, and it does not appear that this has 
always happened in this arena.  It appears, in fact, that certain questions 
involving presumptions and framing of the issues remain relevant, re-
gardless of the factual permutations involved, and can be applied to raise 
questions about the validity of certain measures.  Given the sometimes 
extreme variations liberal democracies have taken from their traditional 
and long-standing values of judicial fairness, these questions might pro-
                                               
17 GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 1 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & 
Kent Roach eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
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vide a meaningful way of providing a baseline approach to new ques-
tions that continually arise in this inconsistent and constantly changing 
area. 
II. PRESUMPTIONS OF CHANGE AND THE TERRORISM DISCOURSE 
Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political 
and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or 
that individual writer.  But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the 
original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so 
on indefinitely.  A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a 
failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks.  It is rather 
the same thing that is happening to the English language.  It becomes ugly 
and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our 
language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.18 
 
Those seeking to advance a certain approach have worked to control 
the public discourse surrounding these issues, and an entirely new voca-
bulary has emerged in relation to terrorism, particularly within the U.S.  
The war of words has, at times, related to fundamental and threshold is-
sues – such as, is this new fight against terrorism actually a war, or is ter-
rorism a criminal matter?  More subtle terminology, perhaps not new, but 
new in the popular lexicon, has emerged, and terms like “extraordinary 
rendition,” “enemy combatant,” “enhanced interrogation techniques” and 
“waterboarding” have gained everyday familiarity.  How an issue could 
be perceived has had a great deal to do with how governments respond-
ed, whether it was the specter of the imminent destruction of our way of 
life, and even our own personal safety, through a terrorist attack, or the 
equally stark predictions of the destruction of constitutional liberty prin-
ciples brought about in a misguided and panicked response to the threat 
of terrorism.
19
  
                                               
18 GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 
156 (Harcourt Brace 1981) [hereinafter ORWELL]. 
19 See LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM (Cyn-
thia Brown ed., 2003); see also Obama tries to change terrorism rhetoric, MSNBC, Apr. 
7, 2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36220859/-ns/politics-white_house/ 
(providing an example of how conscious decisions are made as to the most effective 
rhetoric to use to accomplish a given end in this context). 
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The language used in the terrorism context often lacks a certain 
amount of nuance, instead involving issues characterized in stark, “ei-
ther/or,” terms.20  In talking about whether to pass specific legislation, 
for instance, the framing of the issue may have been a key point in de-
termining how the public, and often legislative bodies, would perceive 
the appropriate course to take.  A common tendency, for instance, is for 
people to discuss the need to “balance” security against human rights, 
and this “balancing” notion is often accepted, with little questioning into 
whether these are, in fact, commensurable notions that must involve a 
trade-off.
21
  It is simply assumed to be true and structures are then built 
on this assumption. 
This approach appears, at times, to be in contrast with the approach 
taken by some national high courts, in which the actions taken are meas-
ured against the discourse of long-standing constitutional principles, ra-
ther than the somewhat newer semantics of recent public discourse. That 
constitutional discourse has, at times, seemed incompatible with the pub-
lic discourse surrounding terrorism, and in many ways it appears to un-
derpin the conflict often arising between the judiciary and public offi-
cials.
22
 
Of course, the most obvious example of a way in which discourse 
can impact policies is seen through the designation of recent events as 
the “War on Terror” – a designation that, itself, is the product of this new 
                                               
20 For similar examples of the polarized presentation of some of these issues, see, 
e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (David Haugen ed., 2007) (collecting 
issues from various people, with opposing perspectives presented on certain questions, 
including some relating to the limitations of civil rights in the name of national security); 
see also GLENN GREENWALD, A TRAGIC LEGACY: HOW A GOOD VS. EVIL MENTALITY 
DESTROYED THE BUSH PRESIDENCY 8, 14, 26-32 (2007).  
21 See, e.g., Stuart Macdonald, The Unbalanced Imagery of Antiterrorism Policy, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (2009) (criticizing the traditional language characterizing 
a need for “balance” between national security interests and individual civil liberties); 
Gerd Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love: The Intricate Convergence of Human Rights and 
Human Security, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 588 (2005) (examining the asserted conflict 
between security and rights); see also A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (expressly rejecting the UK Government‟s contention that 
the anti-terrorism provision at issue allowed the Government to “balance” state security 
versus an individual‟s right to personal liberty). 
22 See generally TIMOTHY LYNCH, DOUBLESPEAK AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM, 
(2006), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp98.pdf (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 
Politics and the English Language, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 156 (1981)); WILLIAM 
LUTZ, THE NEW DOUBLESPEAK: WHY NO ONE KNOWS WHAT ANYONE‟S SAYING 
ANYMORE (1996) (describing this phenomenon dating well before the 9/11 attacks); 
RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005). 
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vocabulary and of terminology that was formally abandoned when the 
U.S. Governmental Administration changed.
23
  While abandoning the 
war terminology, however, the new U.S. administration has not entirely 
abandoned the structures that were created under that discourse.  A ter-
rorism suspect might now be classified as an “enemy combatant,” or as a 
criminal defendant, for essentially the same conduct, and the designation 
chosen is dispositive in determining the judicial process the person can 
expect to receive.
24
  If the same person were to be characterized as a sus-
pect in criminal activity, holding the person indefinitely with no judicial 
process would seem unimaginable.
25
  Somehow, though, through an on-
going public discourse, doing so has become accepted when the detainee 
                                               
23 Clinton: New Team not Using “War on Terror” Term, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 30, 
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-30-global-
war_N.htm. 
24 Many of the cases at Guantanamo Bay, for instance, raise this inference. While 
some detainees were arrested on battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq, others were not.  In 
the case of the “Algerian Six,” for example, six men who were either citizens or residents 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina were arrested by U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
shortly after a court in that country had cleared them of any connection with a plot to 
bomb the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.  They were held at Guantanamo Bay for several 
years, and one of the men, Lakhdar Boumediene, became the named party for the Boum-
ediene v. Bush decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. Throughout their captivity, the U.S. 
Government had claimed they were being held on suspicion of plotting to bomb the U.S. 
Embassy, a claim later abandoned in favor of more vague claims that they had provided 
assistance to Al Qaeda.  After the Boumediene decision granted habeas corpus rights to 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, five of the six men were ordered released by a U.S. federal  
judge. See Boumediene v. Bush,  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 
No. 04-1166, Memorandum Order (2008); Pardiss Kebriaei, Citizens Betrayed: Algerian 
group v. BiH, Nov. 19, 2007, available at 
www.pulsdemokratije.net/index.php?id=576&l=en (explaining the procedural history of 
the six members of the so-called “Algerian Group” or “Algerian Six”) [hereinafter Kebri-
aei]. 
25
 See generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence 
of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) (delineating 
the parameters relating to terrorism detentions as to what has been categorized under a 
military detention model, and what remains under the criminal justice model); RICHARD 
B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM 
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf;  RICHARD B. 
ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS (2009), available at http://www.human-rightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-in-
pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf (providing a compelling and detailed case for the effective-
ness of the U.S. criminal justice system in addressing terrorism cases). 
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is suspected of terrorism involvement, and sometimes all that seems to 
have been required was for a government to attach this onerous-sounding 
label to the person.
26
  The importance of the language used cannot be 
overstated, as it paints the picture under which various actions are then 
set forth as justified.  As Orwell pointed out, language can be the impetus 
for bringing about a change in societal values, as well as being a reflec-
tion of cultural changes that have already taken place, with both compo-
nents creating an endless loop.
27
 
As time passes, it appears that certain notions have become so em-
bedded in the discourse that they cannot now be dispelled, and that a 
fundamental shift has taken place in certain traditional cultural values.  
The 9/11 attacks caused a ripple effect throughout many liberal democra-
cies, under which “the soft and facilitating state was replaced by a strong 
and intrusive state, and the categorical gap between rights-based demo-
cracies and authoritarian polities narrowed worryingly under a declared 
open-ended state of emergency and the so called „war on terror.‟”28  This 
dramatic shift in principles once deemed foundational appears to have 
created a lack of underlying stability in certain elements of democratic 
governance, described by one author as “democracy without moor-
ings.”29  The larger impact of these changes makes fundamental underly-
ing questions that much more critical.  Questions emerge in relation to 
these changes that go well beyond positivistic analyses of whether the 
changes fit into existing formal legal mandates, but instead go to larger 
issues of whether the changes can be sustained as a matter of logic and 
consistent with proclaimed values.  
A. Using the Discourse to Create Presumptions 
It is notable that, as a very general matter, presumptions tend to be 
in favor of the status quo.  Generally speaking, many of the objections to 
the alterations in detention practices shortly after 9/11 were based on the 
presumption that the pre-existing legal structures were adequate to ad-
dress any threat of terrorism, and also that pre-existing constitutional 
                                               
26 It is notable that this “combatant” terminology is largely used by the United States 
as its war paradigm for addressing terrorism cases. 
27 See ORWELL, supra note 18. 
28 Dora Kostakopoulou, How to do Things With Security Post 9/11, 28 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 317 (2008) (describing the discourse of security particularly with relation to 
the United Kingdom). 
29 Id.  
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standards were inviolable, at least absent a compelling and individualized 
showing of necessity.  Opponents of many of the altered standards im-
plemented after 9/11 suggested that, before implementing any changes, 
governments had the burden of proving that the changes were necessary 
and permissible.  It appears now that the passage of years has created the 
same status quo presumption in terms of the alterations.  Take, for in-
stance, Robert Gates‟s comment about the Military Commissions, quoted 
above, in which he describes the beginning of trials for some, but not all, 
detainees, and the reconstituting of the Military Commissions as a “step 
in the right direction.”30  The question arises as to what direction they 
deem themselves to be walking in, and what the starting point is for the 
walk.  If the starting point is long-standing constitutional values, then ra-
ther than a step in the right direction, such changes might be viewed as 
just less of a deviation from acceptable norms, but a deviation nonethe-
less.  If the starting point is the alteration, which now enjoys the pre-
sumption of validity, then any step away from that point is described as a 
positive change, rather than simply a less negative state of affairs.  The 
point at which the discussion begins, and the presumption regarding the 
status quo, make a significant difference as to the perception of the valid-
ity of a given measure. 
The power of presumptions and burdens of proof is well docu-
mented in legal discourse, which is why the presumption of innocence 
for criminal defendants is so powerful, and why the burden of proof in 
such cases is generally placed on the State.  In allowing these emergency 
detention standards to be so quickly implemented, and then to take root, 
governments may have created a situation in which the presumption fa-
vors these hastily created structures, rather than favoring the pre-existing 
constitutional structures relating to the detentions of those suspected of 
terrorism or other offenses.  This, if true, is a significant underlying 
component of many national anti-terrorism initiatives, and raises ques-
tions as to whether these new presumptions impact other criminal pro-
ceedings, as well as to whether, with the presumption shifted away from 
constitutional norms, those constitutional principles have been dimi-
nished. 
Clearly, detention standards for terrorism suspects have evolved 
                                               
30 Guantanamo Announcement, supra note 11. 
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since the early days after 9/11, but what remains is that, for certain detai-
nees, a presumption of guilt still attaches, and a presumption exists that 
the person should be detained, unless that person can demonstrate other-
wise.  Moreover, a culture allowing for preventive detention of future 
terrorists has arisen.  The niche of “terrorism” has created in the minds of 
many a seemingly permanent state of exception, so people who might 
question certain governmental actions in other contexts are more muted 
where terrorism is at issue.  While one might justify not vigorously ques-
tioning this shift in the early days after the attacks, when a sense of im-
mediate danger may have attached, it is much more difficult to justify al-
lowing it to continue many years after the attacks, when an environment 
of greater calm should prevail. The changes implemented to this end tend 
to be rather generalized, rather than narrowly tailored to address one ex-
pressly identified threat, and the correlation between the detention prac-
tices implemented and an effective response to terrorism is not always 
clear.
31
 
Terrorism has in many ways stepped out of its traditional place in 
national criminal justice systems, and the policy of punishment for past 
crimes has become blurred with a more general sense that detention is 
now necessary for prevention of future crimes.  Moreover, in relation to 
alleged past acts of terrorism, national security concerns became increa-
singly cited as a basis for side-stepping traditional criminal proceedings, 
and for altering the process afforded those accused.  Instead, the safety-
liberty intersection is treated as a balance of commensurable and diame-
trically opposing elements.
32
  The argument is made that detention prac-
                                               
31 See Michael P. Scharf & Gwen Gillespie, Foreword: Security Detention, 40 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT‟L L. 315 (2009) (noting "[a]lthough western democracies such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, justify the minimal procedural protections on 
grounds of national security, these same governments rarely offer more than a cursory 
explanation as to why a given detainee constitutes such a threat.”). 
32 There are scholars who question whether these two factors are automatically the 
antithesis of each other, but such questions tend not to be extensively examined in the 
jurisprudence and legislative enactments undertaken regarding these issues, nor in the 
more theoretical writings on this topic. For an example of one work questioning the 
commensurability of “security” versus “liberty,” see DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS 
SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007).  For an example 
of an approach that begins with an acceptance of the “balance” notion, although arguing 
in favour of protection of individual liberties, see MARK SIDEL, MORE SECURE, LESS 
FREE?--ANTITERRORISM POLICY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2004). The 
issue of commensurability is introduced here simply to raise the question of whether this 
acceptance of the “balance” of these two factors has played a major role in a shift towards 
a more state-centric, and less individual-oriented, model of criminal procedure. For an 
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tices may be altered in a way that circumvents traditional notions of due 
process, if that circumvention can be claimed to reduce the risk of a ter-
rorist attack, then the rather general and often simplistic statement of 
“necessity” is frequently the extent to which such “balancing” is justi-
fied. 
Some simply concede that this shift in presumptions has occurred, 
and that it is inevitable that prevention detention and altered judicial 
process will be permanent structures of terrorism detentions going for-
ward.  The Brookings Institution, for example, released a report in 2009, 
relating to the “incapacitation” of terrorism suspects, which suggests that 
there is a “consensus” that at least some of these altered detention prac-
tices must be accepted as permanent.
33
  
It is most likely because of the judiciary‟s role in safeguarding con-
stitutional principles that, in a number of countries, national high courts 
have sometimes emerged as the strongest voice in favor of civil liberties, 
and sometimes as the ongoing lone voice where the advance away from 
individual-rights dominance otherwise continues unabated.  Listening to 
the voices of some of these judicial bodies makes it clear that, unlike the 
fatalistic acceptance by so many that there is a consensus that constitu-
tional protections of individual rights must give way to national security 
concerns, those charged with safeguarding constitutional protections do 
not always concede this point.
34
  For example, in a ruling of the UK 
                                                                                                         
overview of commensurability and its history in the analysis of law, see generally Jeanne 
L. Schroeder, Apples and Oranges: The Commensurability Debate in Legal Scholarship, 
(Cardozo Law Sch., Pub. Law, Paper No. 48, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=326821.  
33 BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. PEPPARD, DESIGNING DETENTION: A MODEL 
LAW FOR TERRORIST INCAPACITATION (Governance Studies at Brookings 2009), available 
at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_det
ention_wittes.pdf. 
34 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (finding significant por-
tions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, as it pertained to habeas corpus rights, to 
be unconstitutional. The Military Commissions Act had been enacted by the U.S. Con-
gress and signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush). Compare, however, the 
disposition concerning the same detainees before the European Court of Human Rights, 
which found the detainees‟ claim inadmissible, and thus accorded no fault in the alleged 
actions of the Bosnian Government, in spite of strong indications that they kidnapped the 
six detainees, often referred to as the “Algerian Six” and turned them over to U.S. cus-
tody, even after a Bosnian court had cleared the six of any wrongdoing. Boumediene et 
al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (2008), 2008 WL 5683947 (it is un-
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House of Lords, issued at about the same time that the Brookings Institu-
tion issued its report, Lord Hope lambasted the government‟s use of se-
cret evidence in certain terrorism actions, warning: 
The consequences of a successful terrorist attack are likely to be so appall-
ing that there is an understandable wish to support the system that keeps 
those who are considered to be most dangerous out of circulation for as 
long as possible. But the slow creep of complacency must be resisted.  If 
the rule of law is to mean anything, it is in cases such as these that the court 
must stand by principle. It must insist that the person affected be told what 
is alleged against him.35 
The debate over preventive detentions and abridged judicial pro-
ceedings for terrorism suspects is far from over, and yet it is increasingly 
clear that a certain complacency is seeping into the political discourse.  
This complacency is disturbing, given that long-standing constitutional 
protections have often been swept aside on a cursory analysis of the pre-
mises for doing so, and often without regard to the larger implications 
outside of the terrorism context.  It is also disturbing, given the fact that 
many of the present anti-terrorism detention structures were built upon 
emergency measures implemented shortly after 9/11, which, again, were 
often built on certain presumptions that appear to be questionable. 
B. The Presumption of “The Other” as the More Likely Terrorist 
Although a number of underlying presumptions might be identified 
as having fueled the initial anti-terrorism responses of national govern-
ments, perhaps the most prominent one, and the one that will be assessed 
in this article, is the notion of “the Other.”  Although this concept has 
considerable theoretical underpinning, put in its most simple form, it in-
volves classifying a particular group with characteristics, beginning with 
aspects of the group that differ from those of one‟s own group.36  Nation-
al origin, religion, race, gender, and citizenship provide the most easy 
and obvious mechanisms under which people are seen as “the Other,” 
                                                                                                         
clear, however, how much of the ECHR‟s ruling was influenced by the rather unusual 
procedural posture of this case in the U.S., since the U.S. Supreme Court had already 
ruled relating to these particular detainees, and, as a result, habeas petitions were pending 
before the federal court in the U.S. This posture may have influenced the ECHR‟s con-
clusion that the detainees were receiving adequate process through proceedings in the 
U.S.). 
35 Sec'y of State for the Home Dep‟t. v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, ¶ 84 (U.K.). 
36 See. e.g., EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). 
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and this one-dimensional way of viewing certain groups makes it much 
easier to view those groups as different, and to thus attribute characteris-
tics to the group as a whole. 
In the case of the post-9/11 responses, an obvious and widespread 
example of this phenomenon seems to have related to citizenship.  It is 
apparent from a number of the national responses to the attacks that there 
was an underlying presumption that non-citizens of a given country were 
more likely than citizens to be terrorists.  It is not uncommon for national 
governments, when faced with perceived threats, to tighten their borders 
and to view non-citizens with some suspicion.
37
  That the horrors of 9/11 
were allegedly committed by 19 men, who were not citizens of the U.S., 
and who claimed to act in the name of Islam, likely had a heavy role in 
shaping the form of the response.  After 9/11, a number of governments 
expressly instituted security measures that applied only to non-citizens, 
or enhanced the use of such existing structures.  The forms varied, and 
some of the governments that implemented this initial response have 
since modified their approaches.
38
  
While the U.S. model has been heavily characterized by the “war 
versus crime” debates, a major aspect of the post-9/11 approach to terror-
ism also involved use of the immigration system. Measures included 
tightening security at U.S. Borders, round-ups of “special-interest” detai-
nees who were specifically identified as men from particular, largely 
Muslim, countries, and interrogation and sometimes controversial “rendi-
tions” of people passing through U.S. ports of entry, all under an appar-
ent assumption that the immigration system could legitimately be used as 
a primary anti-terrorism tool.
39
  In places like Canada and the UK, there 
                                               
37 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 85 (2003) (discussing at length the U.S. 
post-9/11 responses involving non-citizens, and analyzing historical precedent for similar 
panics against non-citizens) [hereinafter COLE, ENEMY ALIENS]. 
38 See, e.g., Dominic McGoldrick, Security Detention: United Kingdom Practice, 40 
CASE W. RES. J. INT‟L L. 507 (2009) (explaining the genesis of the current system of con-
trol orders in the UK, instituted after the Government abandoned a practice of relying on 
its immigration system as a primary anti-terrorism tool). 
39 COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 37; see also Hon. Paul H. McConnell, Military 
Commissions and the Global War on Terror: Due Process in a War-Fighting Paradigm,  
45 JUDGES' J. 18 (2006); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Execu-
tive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255 (2006); Muneer I. 
Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Pas-
sion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1272-73 (2004) (stating that the U.S. Government had the 
DUFFY FINAL- 41 TO 73 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2011  3:55 PM 
58 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.1:9 2010] 
has also been an explicit trend towards securitizing the immigration sys-
tem, and the immigration system, rather than the criminal-justice system, 
has been used in these countries at different times as a primary terrorism 
fighting tool.
40
  The assumption appears to have been that the immigra-
tion system, initially designed as a tool for controlling entry, could re-
place the criminal-justice system as a primary system for addressing the 
threat of terrorism.
41
  
The UK initially relied heavily on its own immigration system to 
detain those it suspected of terrorism, resulting in the House of Lords 
blasting the government for its treatment of foreign nationals in the 
landmark Belmarsh Detainees case.  The Law Lords criticized the Gov-
ernment on issues of logic in its apparent assumption that non-nationals 
were more likely to be terrorists, and on more fundamental issues relat-
ing to cornerstone constitutional principles, arising from the UK‟s che-
rished common law tradition.  Some of the most compelling language re-
garding individual liberties for terrorism suspects arose in this context, 
and it resulted in the Government abandoning its reliance on the immi-
gration system in favor of a system of control orders that can be applied 
to citizens as well as non-citizens – a system that has been riddled with 
its own controversy.
42
 
At issue was the status of 16 non-citizens, who were certified under 
immigration legislation and detained at London's Belmarsh prison.  None 
of the detainees were charged with any criminal offense, and there was 
no apparent plan to hold any criminal trials.
43
 
                                                                                                         
appropriate option of electing to proceed under the immigration system in criminal mat-
ters, implying that the two systems are interchangeable, while critiquing the course fol-
lowed by the U.S. Government). 
40 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (revising various sections of the U.S. Code) (“USA Patriot Act”) (subse-
quently revised and renewed); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 S.C., ch. 27 
(Can.) (subsequently revised); Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, part 4 (U.K.) 
(subsequently revised). 
41 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON 
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 
ATTACKS ch. 4 (2003), available at  http://www.us-doj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm.  
42 See McGoldrick, supra note 38. 
43 John Ip, National Security: Detention, War Powers, and Anti-Proliferation, 16 
TRANSNAT‟L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 797 (2007); A (FC) and others (FC) v. Sec'y of 
State for the Home Dep't,   [2004] UKHL 56 (U.K.) ¶ 2  [hereinafter Belmarsh Detai-
nees]. 
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The detainees argued that this detention scheme conflicted with the 
UK's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
with the Human Rights Act of 1998.  They further argued that the UK 
was not legally entitled to derogate from these standards, and, that, even 
if such derogation were permissible, the specific nature of the derogation 
would still be impermissible, because the measures taken went beyond 
what was required to address any emergency.
44
 
The Law Lords had different bases for their findings, but the deci-
sion stands out for the strong nature of language used to criticize immi-
gration detentions in terrorism cases.  For example, Lord Scott famously 
said: 
An individual who is detained . . . will be a person accused of no crime but 
a person whom the Secretary of State has certified that he "reasonably . . . 
suspects . . . is a terrorist". . . .  The individual may then be detained in 
prison indefinitely.  True it is that he can leave the United Kingdom if he 
elects to do so but the reality in many cases will be that the only country to 
which he is entitled to go will be a country where he is likely to undergo 
torture if he does go there.  He can challenge before the SIAC the reasona-
bleness of the Secretary of State's suspicion that he is a terrorist but has no 
right to know the grounds on which the Secretary of State has formed that 
suspicion.  The grounds can be made known to a special advocate ap-
pointed to represent him but the special advocate may not inform him of 
the grounds and, therefore, cannot take instructions from him in refutation 
of the allegations made against him.  Indefinite imprisonment in conse-
quence of a denunciation on grounds that are not disclosed and made by a 
person whose identity cannot be disclosed is the stuff of nightmares, asso-
ciated whether accurately or inaccurately with France before and during the 
Revolution, with Soviet Russia in the Stalinist era and now associated, as a 
result of section 23 of the 2001 Act, with the United Kingdom.45 
Lord Hoffman was equally scathing in his critique.  He clarified, 
however, that there were problems with the detention structure that went 
beyond the citizen/non-citizen distinction, and that this distinction was 
only one of several shortcomings with the scheme:  
I said that the power of detention is at present confined to foreigners and I 
would not like to give the impression that all that was necessary was to ex-
                                               
44 Belmarsh Detainees, [2004] UKHL 56. 
45 Id. ¶ 155 (internal citations omitted). 
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tend the power to United Kingdom citizens as well.  In my opinion, such a 
power in any form is not compatible with our constitution.  The real threat 
to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with 
its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from 
laws such as these.  That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve.  
It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.46 
The Lords also criticized the use of an immigration system to ad-
dress a security matter on the basis of simple logic.  Lord Scott in partic-
ular attacked the logic of restricting anti-terrorism measures to one 
group, even if arguments are set forth that more members of that group 
might be terrorists.  He described such distinctions as “irrational and dis-
criminatory,” saying that some people not in the targeted groups could 
very well turn out to be terrorists as well.
47
  Although the British Gov-
ernment subsequently eliminated the citizen/non-citizen distinction as a 
major component of terrorism detentions, it implemented a system of 
control orders that limit the movements of those suspected of terrorism, 
but apply to both citizens and non-citizens.
48
 
Canada had occasion to examine a similar use of its own immigra-
tion legislation in relation to “security certificates,” which are issued for 
those subject to the immigration system who are deemed inadmissible for 
national security reasons.  The Supreme Court of Canada specifically 
cited the British system in finding that the prior system of security certif-
icates was unconstitutional, primarily because the proceedings were es-
tablished without proper access by the detainee to the evidence against 
him.  The Canadian court found, unlike the House of Lords, that the 
scheme of detentions relating only to non-citizens was not discriminato-
ry, distinguishing the legislation in the UK based on the fact that it al-
lowed for indefinite detentions.
49
  In so doing, the Canadian court dif-
                                               
46 Id. ¶ 97. 
47 Id. ¶ 158. 
48 Chris Johnston, Hopes of Belmarsh Terror Detainees Dashed, TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 
26, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1457086_1,00.html.; see 
also Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46, ¶¶ 34–40, 54, 60–77, 
82–87 (U.K.); Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, ¶ 56 (U.K).; 
Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t v. E, [2007] UKHL 47 (U.K) (rulings issued the same 
day, containing varying critiques); Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t. v. AF, [2009] 
UKHL 28. 
49 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 
SCC 9, at ¶¶ 125-32 (Can.) [hereinafter Charkaoui]. For a discussion of the Charkaoui 
case, and the legislation passed in response to the ruling, see Maureen T. Duffy & René 
Provost, Constitutional Canaries and the Elusive Quest to Legitimize Security Detentions 
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fered from the express finding in the House of Lords that use of the im-
migration system as a whole was an invalid and discriminatory approach 
to terrorism detentions, so a law was passed, which was designed to ad-
dress the concerns of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding evidence, 
and which was still based on the immigration system, and on the citi-
zen/non-citizen distinction.
50
  As an express selling point as the law was 
debated in Parliament, people were told that they had no reason to be 
concerned, because these controversial practices could not be used 
against Canadian citizens.
51
  Several of the original detainees in Canada, 
however, have since had their security certificates quashed, and have 
been released, and the Canadian Government announced in late 2009 that 
it intends to re-examine the controversial system of security certifi-
cates.
52
 
1. The “Other” to Whom? 
The notion of “the Other,” or that non-citizens are to be treated dif-
ferently, is, not surprisingly, also evident in the war paradigm created 
within the U.S. after 9/11.  The Military Order, for instance, under which 
President Bush first established the Military Commissions at Guantana-
mo Bay, specifically delineated that such proceedings could only be used 
                                                                                                         
in Canada, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT‟L L. 531 (2009). 
50
 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Part 1, Div. 9, § 83-87.1 (2008) 
(Can).   
51 Canadian Minister of Public Safety, the Hon. Stockwell Day, said, before the 
House of Commons in support of the proposed legislation,  
“I would encourage all colleagues to set aside partisanship to realize that the secu-
rity certificates have been proven not to threaten the individual rights and freedoms 
of Canadians. As a matter of fact, the security certificate cannot even be applied 
against a Canadian citizen. It can only be used on foreign nationals or those who 
are not Canadian citizens.”  
142 39th Parl. Deb., H.C. 2nd Session, (2008) No. 041, at 1340, available at 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&-
Doc=41&Language=E&Mo-de=1&Parl=39&Ses=2. 
52 Government will review anti-terrorist law: Van Loan, CBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2009, 
available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/12/13/national-security-certificates-
review.html; see also Cristin Schmitz, Special advocates predict no more security certifi-
cates, The Lawyers Weekly, July 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&volume=30&number=11&arti
cle=1. 
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to try “certain non-citizens.”53  
In a traditional armed conflict, those taken prisoner would normally 
have citizenship of the country with whom the conflict has arisen, al-
though there could be some exceptions to that.  In the “War on Terror,” 
however, this played out quite differently.  It was reported at one point 
that nationals of at least 36 countries were detained at Guantanamo Bay, 
including the nationals of countries who were allies of the U.S. in various 
aspects of its War on Terror.
54
 
The citizen/non-citizen distinction has thus created complex scena-
rios as some of these governments struggled to determine what their re-
sponsibilities were to their own nationals, and the way in which a person 
was processed and treated as a detainee of the U.S. as part of the War on 
Terror often depended heavily on the person‟s citizenship.  In Canada, 
there has been considerable controversy over the case of Omar Khadr, 
who is a Canadian citizen and was 15 years old when he was captured 
and injured after a firefight in Afghanistan.  He has been held at Guanta-
namo Bay for most of the time since his capture in 2002. 
As a non-citizen of the U.S., Khadr is subject to trial by Military 
Commission under the standards laid out by the U.S. Government.  As a 
citizen of Canada, it is perhaps ironic that, were he physically present in 
Canada, he would not be subject to the security certificates that have 
been so controversial in Canada.
55
  Citizenship appears, in many cases, to 
be a bright-line rule in determining how a terrorism suspect will be 
                                               
53 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002). 
54 See ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774 
DETAINEES IN AMERICA'S ILLEGAL PRISON  (Pluto Press 2007).  Although not examined in 
depth in this article, much controversy arose as well as to whether many of the people 
detained at Guantanamo Bay as “enemy combatants,” were, in fact, “combatants” at all, 
or whether they were people arrested in what really amounted to criminal investigations. 
The cases of the “Algerian Group,” provide an example of this phenomenon, as the six 
were arrested, not on a battlefield, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina, shortly after a court 
there had exonerated them of accusations of involvement in terrorism. The controversy 
surrounding Guantanamo Bay certainly goes well beyond the citizen/non-citizen distinc-
tion discussed herein. See Kebriaei, supra note 24 (explaining the background of the “Al-
gerian Group”). 
55 It cannot be assumed, however, that, were he present in Canada, he could not be 
sent to Guantanamo Bay, but he would, generally, have greater protection. In the case of 
the “Algerian Group,” the six people were actually present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the country of citizenship for some of them (and residency for the others), when U.S. of-
ficials, allegedly with the complicity of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ar-
rested them and took them to Guantanamo Bay. See Kebriaei, supra note 24.   
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treated, and in some ways of even greater significance than the underly-
ing alleged conduct of the person involved.
56
 
Specific aspects of Khadr‟s detention at Guantanamo Bay have 
twice been the subject of proceedings before the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, which is interesting, because he is a prisoner of the United States, 
not of Canada.
57
  To demonstrate some of the complexities that can arise 
from this presumptive use of the “Other” to distinguish people based on 
citizenship, this section will describe the facts and rulings relating to 
Khadr. 
In the first case, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Cana-
dian Security Intelligence Services agency (“CSIS”) was required to turn 
over notes of an interview of Khadr, undertaken by its agents at Guanta-
namo Bay.  The agents visited Khadr there, interviewed him, and then 
turned over the notes of the interview to the U.S. Government, but not to 
Khadr or his attorneys.
58
  In ordering CSIS to turn over the information 
to Khadr‟s attorneys, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that, normally, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter “the Charter”) 
is not deemed to apply to the actions of Canadian officials while outside 
of Canada.  Where, however, “clear violations of international law and 
fundamental human rights begin,” there is an exception to the principle 
of comity.
59
 
The Supreme Court of Canada noted that it had to determine, then, 
whether there was such a violation.  In the case of Guantanamo Bay, it 
noted that it was unnecessary for it to rule on the issue, because the Court 
                                               
56 Some of the terminology in this instance is rather convoluted, since Khadr was 
captured as a combatant in Afghanistan, and designated as an “enemy combatant,” which 
is the term the U.S. Government has frequently used since 9/11 to refer to those deemed 
to be affiliated with the Taliban or Al Qaeda, although the term has different meanings in 
different contexts, sometimes also interchanged with “unlawful combatants” or “unlawful 
enemy combatants.”.Although captured as a combatant during a firefight, Khadr has been 
treated as an unlawful combatant, in essence, by the U.S. Government, and he has been 
denied the protections of the Geneva Conventions.  
57 In this section, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada are both 
mentioned repeatedly. To avoid confusion, the short forms will not be used within this 
section, and the full name will be used to clarify to which court a specific reference ap-
plies. 
58 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, 2008 SCC 28 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Khadr I]. 
59 Id. ¶ 18 (quoting R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26, ¶¶ 51-52, 101). 
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could, instead, defer to prior rulings of the U.S.  Supreme Court, which 
found that the proceedings at Guantanamo Bay improperly deprived the 
detainees of habeas corpus rights, and that they were subject to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949.
60
  The CSIS agents had interviewed Khadr at 
Guantanamo Bay before the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, and be-
fore the changes that were made in response to those rulings, so the Su-
preme Court of Canada determined that, as of the time of the interviews, 
Khadr‟s detention and the Military Commissions he faced were in viola-
tion of these principles.  Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada noted,  
[t]he violations of human rights identified by the United States Supreme 
Court are sufficient to permit us to conclude that the regime providing for 
the detention and trial of Mr. Khadr at the time of the CSIS interviews con-
stituted a clear violation of fundamental human rights protected by interna-
tional law.61 
The Supreme Court of Canada explained that Canada is a signatory 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which have been incorporated into 
Canadian law, and that habeas corpus is an inviolable right under both 
the Geneva Conventions and the Charter.  Based on these violations, the 
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that there was “no question of defe-
rence to foreign law.”62  The remedy, the Supreme Court of Canada sug-
gested, related to the extent of the participation in the process by Cana-
dian officials, pointing out: 
The crux of that participation was providing information to U.S. authorities 
in relation to a process which is contrary to Canada‟s international human 
rights obligations.  Thus, the scope of the disclosure obligation must be re-
lated to the information provided to U.S. authorities.63 
The Supreme Court of Canada, noting that it did not have the full 
information before it to determine what information had been turned over 
to U.S. authorities, left it to the federal court to make that determination.  
The Canadian Government had attempted to argue that the disclosure du-
ty related solely to disclosure from the U.S. authorities who were prose-
cuting him, and the Supreme Court of Canada expressly disagreed, not-
ing that the remedy was for the breach, by Canadian officials, of 
Canada‟s international obligations, and that Khadr was entitled to that 
                                               
60 Id. ¶¶ 21-26 (citing to Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)). 
61 Id. ¶ 24. 
62 Id. ¶ 26. 
63 Id. ¶¶ 31-32. 
DUFFY FINAL- 41 TO 73 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2011  3:55 PM 
“THE SLOW CREEP OF COMPLACENCY”: ONGOING 
CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRACIES SEEKING TO DETAIN 
TERRORISM SUSPECTS                                                            65 
remedy regardless of any disclosures from the U.S. Government.
64
  
While the Supreme Court of Canada was careful to frame its rulings 
in deferential terms to the U.S. Supreme Court rulings relevant to the is-
sue, it is still a rather unusual situation for a ruling to state that coopera-
tion with a legal process instituted by the U.S. Government is a violation 
of Canada‟s international human rights obligations, and the legal compli-
cations caused by the citizenship distinction in many of these cases is 
well illustrated by Khadr‟s case. 
The Khadr case, of course, is unusual even in the unusual world of 
Guantanamo detentions, in that he was 15 years old when he was cap-
tured.  His attorneys had tried, unsuccessfully, to have him designated as 
a child soldier at Guantanamo Bay, and allegations, provided with subs-
tantiation, that the injured 15- year-old may have been tortured during his 
time in U.S. custody resulted in a strong public response in Canada.
65
  
The Canadian Government has officially taken the position that the U.S. 
legal process must run its course, and has resisted pressure to seek 
Khadr‟s repatriation to Canada.  Some of this may stem from a reaction 
to Khadr‟s family, as they have some notoriety in Canada for having 
been affiliated with Al Qaeda.
66
 
The tensions between those pressuring the Government to seek re-
patriation, and the Government‟s continued resistance to doing so, re-
sulted in a second ruling on Khadr‟s situation by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  This second ruling, issued in late January 2010, again highlights 
some of the citizenship complexities that so often underpin terrorism-
related detentions.
67
 
In Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr [hereinafter Khadr II], the is-
sues before the court were whether Khadr‟s Charter rights had been vi-
olated when Canadian officials interrogated him twice, once with the 
knowledge that Khadr had been mistreated, and, if so, whether that 
                                               
64 Id. ¶ 36. 
65 See Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, 16 (Can.), ¶ 5 [hereinafter 
Khadr II] (describing the circumstances under which Khadr was interrogated by Cana-
dian officials, including being subjected to the “frequent flyer program,” involving sleep 
deprivation, before the interview, and with the knowledge of the official who interviewed 
him in 2004). 
66 See MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO'S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR 
KHADR (2008).  
67
 Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3 (Can.). 
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meant the Supreme Court of Canada could order the Canadian Govern-
ment to undertake efforts to repatriate Khadr.  During the second inter-
view by Canadian authorities, when it is alleged that officials knew he 
had been subjected to extreme sleep deprivation, Khadr refused to an-
swer questions, and a subsequent Canadian federal court injunction 
barred Canadian officials from further interviewing him, citing a concern 
over a potential grave injustice.”68 
The Court noted that Khadr had repeatedly asked the Government 
of Canada to request that the United States return him to Canada.
69
  
When the Canadian Government reiterated, in July 2008, that it would 
not be seeking repatriation of Khadr, but added that it was seeking assur-
ances in regard to his treatment, Khadr filed a petition in federal court.  
The federal court, subsequently upheld in an appellate ruling, determined 
that Canada had a “duty to protect” Khadr, and ordered the Canadian 
Government to undertake efforts to repatriate him.
70
  
Before the Supreme Court, Khadr took the position that, while Can-
ada did not have a broad duty to so act on behalf of all of its citizens 
overseas, it did have a duty to seek his repatriation based on the violation 
of Khadr‟s Charter rights in collaborating with the U.S. Government in 
2003 and 2004. Based on that violation of his rights, he sought, as a re-
medy, that the Government be ordered to undertake efforts to repatriate 
him.
71
 
In considering whether Khadr‟s rights had been violated, the Su-
preme Court noted that the circumstances under which Khadr was held 
had changed since the beginning, noting various legislative and judicial 
rulings setting particular parameters for the Guantanamo detainees.
72
  In 
spite of its acknowledgment of improvements to the system at Guanta-
namo Bay, however, the Supreme Court pointed out that the underlying 
                                               
68
 Id. ¶ 5 (citing Khadr v. Canada, [2006] 2 F.C.R. 505, 2005 FC 1076, ¶ 46 (Can.)). 
69
 Id. ¶ 6.  
70
 Id.  ¶¶ 9-10.   
71 Id.  ¶ 12. 
72 Id. ¶ 17 (explaining the sequence of events as follows: “The Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees 
and required interrogations to be performed according to the Army field manual. The 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, attempted to legal-
ize the Guantanamo regime after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s ruling in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld. However, on June 12, 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Guantanamo Bay detainees have a constitutional right to 
habeas corpus, and struck down the provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
that suspended that right.”). 
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claims on which Khadr was basing his allegations of breach of his Char-
ter rights were the same as those considered and decided in the Khadr I 
decision.
73
 
The Court said:  
[W]e conclude on the record before us that Canada‟s active participation in 
what was at the time an illegal regime has contributed and continues to 
contribute to Mr. Khadr‟s current detention, which is the subject of his cur-
rent claim. The causal connection demanded by Suresh between Canadian 
conduct and the deprivation of liberty and security of person is estab-
lished.74 
Determinations of potential breaches of rights under the Canadian 
Charter involve an additional step, once a violation has been established, 
of determining whether, the violation notwithstanding, the conduct was 
consistent with “principles of fundamental justice.”  In this case, the Su-
preme Court determined that the conduct of Canadian officials did not 
comport with “principles of fundamental justice,” because, when they 
interviewed Khadr, it was part of a system that denied him basic habeas 
corpus rights, and which failed to take into consideration that he was 16 
years old and had not had the benefit of access to legal counsel “or to any 
adult who had his best interests in mind.”75  Describing the conduct of 
Canadian officials in scathing terms, the Court explained: 
Canadian officials questioned Mr. Khadr on matters that may have pro-
vided important evidence relating to his criminal proceedings, in circums-
tances where they knew that Mr. Khadr was being indefinitely detained, 
was a young person and was alone during the interrogations. Further, the 
March 2004 interview, where Mr. Khadr refused to answer questions, was 
conducted knowing that Mr. Khadr had been subjected to three weeks of 
scheduled sleep deprivation, a measure described by the U.S. Military 
Commission in Jawad as designed to “make [detainees] more compliant 
and break down their resistance to interrogation.”76  
One interesting element of this case is that, unlike the Khadr I rul-
ing, the Supreme Court in Khadr II did not base its critique on any prior, 
implicit or explicit, agreement by the U.S. Supreme Court as to its find-
                                               
73 Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3 (Can.) ¶ 18. 
74 Id. ¶ 21. 
75 Id. ¶ 24.  
76 Id.  
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ings.  Contrary to the still somewhat deferential language used in Khadr 
I, the Khadr II decision makes clear the Court‟s disdain, not just for the 
conduct of Canadian officials, but implicitly for that of U.S. officials as 
well.  The Court bluntly noted: 
Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious criminal 
charges while detained in these conditions and without access to counsel, 
and while knowing that the fruits of the interrogations would be shared 
with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian standards about 
the treatment of detained youth suspects.77 
The stronger language used by the Court, which later referred to the 
Canadian officials‟ knowledge of Khadr‟s “improper treatment by the 
U.S. authorities,” seems to suggest some level of outrage on the part of 
the Justices.
78
  Obviously, the Court confined itself to specifically criti-
cizing the conduct of Canadian officials, but the reaction to U.S. actions 
is clear.  
The Court further concluded that the remedy sought was sufficiently 
related to the violation, based on the “continuing effect of these breach-
es.”79  The Court pointed out that the information obtained through these 
improper means by Canadian authorities, and turned over to U.S. offi-
cials, could still be used in legal proceedings against Khadr.
80
 
Having determined in such frank terms that the conduct of the Ca-
nadian authorities violated Khadr‟s Charter rights, however, the Court 
declined to grant the remedy sought.  The Canadian Government had ar-
gued that the Canadian Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court 
the power to interfere with the Executive‟s exercise of foreign relations.81  
The Court explained the deference generally given to the Executive and 
expressed concern about the wider impact beyond this case of ordering 
the Executive to seek repatriation.  Rather, the Court made the following 
statement: 
For the following reasons, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to 
declare that, on the record before the Court, Canada infringed Mr. Khadr‟s 
s. 7 rights, and to leave it to the government to decide how best to respond 
to this judgment in light of current information, its responsibility for for-
                                               
77 Id. ¶ 25. 
78 Id. ¶ 30. 
79 Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3 (Can.). 
80 Id. 
81
 Id. ¶ 33.  
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eign affairs, and in conformity with the Charter.82 
The Court also noted that the record before it did not give it enough 
information on what the Government‟s considerations and concerns were 
relating to Khadr, or what discussions had actually taken place between 
the two Governments on repatriation.
83
  It also pointed out that it learned, 
during the oral arguments on this case, that the U.S. Government had de-
cided to try Khadr before a Military Commission – the announcement 
from the U.S. having been made on the same day as the oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court of Canada – and that this and other develop-
ments required a certain caution on the part of the Court‟s “remedial ju-
risdiction.”84  Thus, the Court concluded, the proper remedy in this in-
stance would be “declaratory relief.”  It granted Khadr a “declaration,” 
advising the Canadian Government of its conclusions as to the question 
and record before it, and suggesting that the declaration provide the “le-
gal framework” to guide the Canadian Government in its future actions.85 
The Canadian Government has continued to refuse to seek repatria-
tion of Khadr.
86
  While the Supreme Court ruling may not be surprising 
in light of courts‟ general reluctance to infringe on constitutional powers 
of other branches of government, it is somewhat surprising in the 
strength of the criticism of both the Canadian and the U.S. Governments 
as to the treatment of this Canadian minor.  The ruling suggests declara-
tory relief to guide certain future actions, and does seem intended to en-
hance the political pressure on the Canadian Government to act on 
Khadr‟s behalf.   
 
The Khadr case continues to present confusing legal issues on both 
sides of the U.S.-Canada border. In Canada, in July 2010, a federal 
judge, hearing Khadr‟s petition following the latest Supreme Court rul-
                                               
82 Id. ¶ 39. 
83 Id. ¶ 44. 
84 Id. ¶ 45. 
85 Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3 (Can.), ¶ 47.  
86 Janice Tibbetts, Government Pondering Alternatives to Repatriation for Khadr, 
CAMWEST NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.canada.com/news/Government+pondering+alternatives+repatriation+Khadr/2
517765/story.html (containing statement by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
that the Government would not seek repatriation in response to the ruling of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, but was seeking other undisclosed remedies). 
DUFFY FINAL- 41 TO 73 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2011  3:55 PM 
70 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.1:9 2010] 
ing, determined that Khadr was entitled to “procedural fairness” by the 
executive in the decision as to the appropriate remedy for violation of his 
rights, and that Khadr has not been afforded this “procedural fairness.” In 
a surprising ruling, the judge found that Khadr had a right to notice of the 
remedies the Government was considering, as well as a right to submit 
suggested remedies. The Government was given seven days to present 
Khadr with a list of potential remedies, and the judge retained jurisdic-
tion to, among other things, determine whether a suggested remedy is 
appropriate if the parties fail to agree. The court also retained jurisdiction 
to impose a remedy if the Government failed to provide an appropriate 
one.
87
 As of the writing of this article, the Canadian Government had an-
nounced its intent to appeal the ruling.
88
 
The continued use of the Military Commissions for hearing Khadr‟s 
case by the U.S. has also led to complications. As of the date of this ar-
ticle, Khadr had fired his civilian attorneys and had informed a Military 
Commission he was boycotting his hearing, because he did not believe 
he could get a fair trial. He had attempted to also fire his military lawyer, 
but the military judge hearing the case denied the request.
89
   
  In telling the Military Commission he was boycotting the proceed-
ings, he said “I‟m going to get 30 years no matter what.”90 As of the date 
of this article, his hearing before the Military Commission has been set 
for August 12, 2010.
91
 
Whether Khadr will be convicted before the Military Commission, 
and what the resulting sentence would be on such a conviction, remain to 
be seen. What is certain is that Khadr, now 23, has been held with no 
criminal proceeding or criminal conviction since he was 15. It is likely 
that the convoluted legal posture of this case – on both sides of the Bor-
der -- will continue into the foreseeable future, and it is not difficult to 
understand Khadr‟s skepticism about the possibility of getting a fair pro-
ceeding at this late date. The theoretical notion of “the Other,” at least 
based on citizenship, has, indeed, created a legal nightmare for some, 
without producing any demonstrable benefit in reducing the risks posed 
by terrorism.  
                                               
87 Khadr and the Prime Minister of Canada et al., 2010 FC 715. 
88 CBC News, Khadr court ruling to be appealed by Ottawa, July 12, 2010, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/07/12/omar-khadr-court-ruling-nicholson.html. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 CBC News, Khadr's Guantanamo trial date set, July 12, 2010, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/07/12/guantanamo-omar-khadr.html. 
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III. CONCLUSION: PERMANENT CHANGES AND THE SHIFTING SANDS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS   
“Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having 
done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.”
92
 
 
Debates over the parameters of appropriate detention standards for 
terrorism suspects will certainly continue, and it is difficult to predict 
how things will develop in this rapidly changing area of the law. In his 
book, The Trial, Franz Kafka describes a world clearly without the con-
stitutional due process protections long established in many democratic 
cultures.  The picture he paints is a chilling one, in which people are ar-
rested but do not know why, where they are unable to decipher the pro-
cedures of the courts before which they stand accused, and in which they 
do not know what evidence is considered to support the unrevealed 
charges.  It is not surprising that some have drawn parallels between 
Kafka‟s nightmare world and many of the structures established in liberal 
democracies to address terrorism cases.  What began as short-term, per-
haps emergency changes in response to a devastating terrorist attack 
have, in many cases, begun to appear to be more fundamental structural 
changes with  some aspects of the feel of Kafka‟s world. 
Those detained since 9/11 may not only be unable to rely on the de-
tention standards that existed before 9/11, but they cannot rely either on 
the standards set in place since that date, since even those parameters 
constantly shift, in large part because of the tension between national ju-
diciaries and executive/legislative branches.  In many cases, without as-
sistance from legal counsel that, before 9/11, would have been deemed 
fundamental, many detainees have been in the unenviable position of 
facing proceedings under conditions of serious mistreatment, in a lan-
guage other than their mother tongues, in a system different from that 
which they might know in their countries of origin, and under rules that 
shift so constantly that it can sometimes be difficult even for legal scho-
lars to stay current.
93
  
The peculiar nature of the present state of terrorism detention stan-
dards was illustrated in a recent Congressional discussion.  As U.S. intel-
                                               
92 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 149 (1937).  
93 See, e.g., STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA 45 (2008).  
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ligence officials advised Congress that another attempted terrorism attack 
in the coming months, in the U.S., was “certain,” a debate ensued over 
the handling of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who unsuccessfully tried to 
blow up a plane on Christmas Day, 2009, by trying to ignite an explosive 
in his underwear.
94
  Some lawmakers harshly criticized the Obama Ad-
ministration, because Abdulmutallab was read his Miranda rights and 
charged in a U.S. criminal court.  The critics contended that providing 
him with Miranda rights was a mistake, and that he should have been 
taken, absent that advisory, for interrogation, before being tried before a 
Military Commission.  Of course, Abdulmutallab is not a U.S. citizen, 
which is the reason it was even possible to raise this issue, and which is 
the reason that these critics simply assumed that the two options were 
comparable alternatives, to be chosen according to necessity or conveni-
ence.  It was noted, in an article describing this debate, that Congress 
heard evidence that Abdulmutallab was, in fact, talking to investigators 
and “providing useful, current and actionable intelligence.”95  Apparent-
ly, the existing criminal justice system is, in fact, proving adequate to 
handle his case, thus undermining even the questionable “necessity” jus-
tifications for altered standards. It is disturbing that constitutional stan-
dards in such cases are simply viewed as optional, to be used only when 
deemed necessary. 
A number of countries continue to struggle with how best to address 
terrorism detentions and legal proceedings, but it is becoming increasing-
ly clear that alterations from existing constitutional principles have been 
accepted on some level, and this debate suggests that certain constitu-
tional protections are entirely flexible and necessary only when useful.  
In the terrorism context, sweeping presumptions, supported by a form of 
discourse that often obfuscates the issues, appear to have undermined 
those principles that have long been established in many democratic na-
tions as threshold principles of fairness and judicial process.  Before 
those changes become permanent, national jurisdictions should consider 
the bases underpinning these changes and should consider the wider im-
plications of such changes in terms of long-standing constitutional prin-
ciples, and, at some level, even in terms of cultural identity.   
                                               
94 Abdulmutallab‟s name is spelled differently in different reports. It sometimes ap-
pears as “Abdul Mutallab,” or as “AbdulMutallab,” and, in this article, the spelling ap-
pearing in most published reports is used. 
95 Intelligence Chiefs Say Another Terror Attempt in U.S. is „Certain,‟ CNN, Feb. 2, 
2010, available at http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/-
02/02/us.terror.attacks/index.html?hpt=T1. 
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